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NOTES
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE CAPS:
NAVIGATING THE SAFE HARBORS
Since the initial recognition of the "tort crisis" in the mid 1970s, state
legislatures have enacted a plethora of legislation designed to limit tort
liability and reduce insurance premiums.1 Much of the legislative reform
has focused on medical malpractice liability.2 In an effort to reduce med-
ical malpractice litigation and minimize liability for health care institu-
tions and professionals, states have enacted comprehensive statutes that
employ various substantive and procedural modifications of the common
law.3 Several first generation statutes never survived initial judicial scru-
tiny.4 Moreover, the effectiveness of statutes currently in place varies
widely.5
Among the most frequently challenged provisions of these statutes are
1. Worker compensation schemes, no fault insurance, and medical malpractice statutes domi-
nate the area of legislative responses to the "tort crisis." California and Florida, however, have
enacted more comprehensive tort reform legislation.
2. In response to the mid-1970 crisis, 43 states enacted medical malpractice legislation. Bell,
Legislative Intrusions Into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thought About the Deterrent
Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 939 n.1 (1984). "There has never been such dramatic
and immediate response by the state legislatures to the pressure for any reform such as the reaction
of all fifty state assemblies to the demands made by and on behalf of the medical profession in 1975."
Fuller, The Insurance Crisis in Medical Malpractice, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 10-1, 10-4 (Illinois
Institute for Continuing Legal Education ed. 1975), quoted in Note, Statutes Limiting Medical Mal-
practice Damages, 32 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Qu. 247 N.2 (1982) [hereinafter DAMAGES].
3. Some of the mechanisms employed include: screening panels, mandatory or non-binding
arbitration provisions, abrogation of the collateral benefits rule, elimination of ad damnum clause,
shortened statute of limitations, provisions clarifying informed consent, absolute damage limitations,
modifications of res ipsa loquitur, limitations on attorney fees, damage limitations supplemented by
state compensation funds, limitations on noneconomic damages, provisions requiring greater speci-
ficity in jury verdicts, periodic payments of damages and stricter physician licensing requirements.
For a more complete discussion of legislative responses to the medical malpractice crisis, see Com-
ment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, DUKE L.J. 1417
(1975); Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REv. 655 (1976).
4. See eg., infra notes 74-106 and accompanying text.
5. In a six state case study of medical malpractice legislation by the United States General
Accounting Office, only Indiana and California reported that their tort law modifications had helped
to moderate insurance and general litigation costs. Certainly Indiana's scheme appears to be one of
the more successful programs nationwide. United States General Accounting Office, Medical Mal-
practice: Six State Case Studies Show Claims and Insurance Costs Still Rise Despite Reforms,
GAO/HRD-87-21 (December 1986).
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those that limit damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action.6
No consensus exists, though, among state courts regarding the constitu-
tionality of these "caps" on damages.7 One obvious reason for the incon-
sistency lies in different judicial perspectives regarding basic
constitutional protections.8 Special provisions unique to certain state
constitutions, however, also play a role.' Another more basic reason for
this lack of uniformity among state court decisions is that the capping
methods employed in the statutes vary.10 Hence, a capping provision
that one state court finds unconstitutional may differ significantly from a
damage limitation upheld in another state.
As more states enact comprehensive medical malpractice statutes"
and other states scramble to fashion second generation statutes that will
survive judicial scrutiny, the need to understand the constitutional pa-
rameters that state courts have set forth becomes paramount. This note
focuses on the alternatives for limiting medical malpractice damages.
Part I considers state court responses to the most frequently asserted
challenges to medical malpractice damage caps: due process and equal
protection violations. Part II evaluates the constitutionality of malprac-
tice damage caps in light of a recent right of a jury trial challenge to the
legislation. Part III then identifies the "safe harbors" remaining in the
area of medical malpractice damage limitations and suggests which alter-
natives hold the greatest likelihood of surviving judicial scrutiny.
I. SCRUTINIZING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE CAPS UNDER
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
State court cases dominate the decisions passing on the constitutional-
ity of medical malpractice caps. 12 Although these decisions turn upon
6. For the purposes of this note, modifications of the collateral source rule and limitations on
attorney's fees are omitted from the classification of "limitation on damages." Although such provi-
sions ultimately affect a malpractice plaintiff's damage award, their inherent problems and operation
are distinct from other more direct methods of damage limitation.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 52-106.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
11. Missouri recently joined the ranks of states enacting comprehensive medical malpractice
statutes. See Mo. REv. STAT., §§ 334.102, 383.105, 383.110 et. seq..
12. Federal court decisions in this area are rare. The Supreme Court dismissed Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group for want of a substantial federal question. See infra notes 66-71 and
accompanying text. Also, the Fourth Circuit recently struck down Virginia's cap on medical mal-
practice damages. See infra notes 104-122 and accompanying text.
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equal protection and due process concerns of the federal Constitution,
the state courts' analyses in these cases are not subject to federal appel-
late review. 3 State courts simultaneously base their decisions on state
constitutional provisions analogous to the federal due process and equal
protection provisions.14 So long as the courts interpret state laws as of-
fering greater protection than the federal Constitution, their decisions
concerning equal protection and due process are not reviewable even by
the Supreme Court.' 5 This is true even if the analysis departs drastically
from the due process and equal protection standards set forth by the
Supreme Court. While a federal court may invalidate decisions uphold-
ing medical malpractice caps, 6 decisions finding caps unconstitutional
are usually final. Consequently, state courts look to Supreme Court deci-
sions for an analytical framework, but freely depart from traditional con-
stitutional analysis when they wish to expand state constitutional
protections.
A. Due Process: Framework and Analysis
Generally, state courts have adopted the Supreme Court's deferential
approach' 7 to economic regulation when reviewing malpractice caps.
The Supreme Court has applied the "rational relationship" test to such
legislation, holding that a provision's constitutionality depends on
whether the means a legislature employs has a real and substantial rela-
tionship to the objective it seeks to attain.' 8 Challenges to economic reg-
13. "The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state cases is limited to the correction of errors
related solely to questions of federal law. It cannot review state court determinations of state law
even when the case also involves federal issues." Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501 n.80 (1977) [hereinafter STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
14. Justice Brennan suggests that state courts may base their decisions solely on state law
grounds in anticipation of contrary rulings by the Supreme Court. STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 13 at 501.
15. STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 13 at 501. Of course, the Supreme Court could con-
ceivably grant certiorari to clarify a state court's interpretation of federal constitutional protections.
A finding of unconstitutionality under a state constitution, however, would stand. Furthermore,
states are free to extend greater constitutional protection than the federal constitution provides.
16. Of course, a federal court could only do so if a state court afforded less Constitutional
protection than the federal court felt the federal Constitution provides.
17. The Supreme Court has not invalidated an economic regulation on substantive due process
grounds since 1937 except in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). The Court overruled that deci-
sion in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
18. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (restating the test as: reasonable in relation to subject and interest of the
community).
1987]
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ulation on traditional due process grounds have fared poorly before the
Supreme Court. State courts generally have viewed due process chal-
lenges to medical malpractice caps on this theory with similar
skepticism.19
State courts have not, however, swept away all challenges made
through the peripheral due process theory of quid pro quo.20 Under this
theory, legislation that takes away a common law right without granting
a reciprocal right or benefit is unconstitutional. Although the Supreme
Court has never invalidated a statute on the quid pro quo theory,2' state
courts seem unwilling to summarily dismiss any quid pro quo chal-
lenge.22 Several courts have concluded that medical malpractice caps do
provide a "societal" quid pro quo.23 Alternatively, other courts have re-
jected claims that damage limitations offer a "societal" quid pro quo, but
have proceeded to invalidate a statute on other grounds.2 4
In Baptist Hospital of Southeast Texas v. Baber2" the Texas Supreme
Court suggested that although the absence of a quid pro quo does not
render a statute unconstitutional, it is a factor to consider in determining
a statute's validity. 26 Here, the court found no quid pro quo and invali-
dated the state's medical malpractice cap on equal protection grounds. 27
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Carson v. Mauer, noted that a
limitation on medical malpractice damages lacks the quid pro quo found
19. E.g., Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 598 (1980).
20. The quid pro quo theory originated in dicta by the Supreme Court in New York Central
R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). In upholding a challenge to New York's worker compensa-
tion law, the Court intimated that due process requires a legislature to supply a "reasonably just
substitute" whenever it abolishes a common law right, 243 U.S. at 200-01.
21. The Court avoids ruling on quid pro quo validity. Instead, it usually observes that the
statute in question does provide a quid pro quo. DAMAGES, supra note 2 at 258.
22. But see Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 869, 555 P.2d 399, 409 (1976)
(holding that no additional quid pro quo test applies to statutes altering common law doctrine); State
ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) (refusing to adopt quid pro
quo).
23. In Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977), the Court rejected the quid
pro quo theory, yet found that promoting affordable malpractice insurance helped ensure that plain-
tiffs could collect judgments. 199 Neb. at 121. In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d
137, 695 P.2d 665 (1985) the California Supreme Court found that preserving "a viable medical
malpractice insurance industry" was enough to satisfy quid pro quo if it were necessary. 38 Cal.3d
at 160, n.18, 695 P.2d at 681-83.
24. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313,328, 347 N.W.2d 736, 742
(1976); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op.3d 164, 172, 355 N.E.2d 903, 910 (1976).
25. 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App. 9 Dist. 1984).
26. Id. at 298.
27. Id. See also infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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in worker's compensation statutes.2" The court, however, relied upon
equal protection analysis to invalidate the state's cap.29 This decision
casts some uncertainty on the significance of the absent quid pro quo3"
under due process analysis.
Even though most courts do not totally disregard quid pro quo argu-
ments, the questionable "emphasis" placed on the doctrine by the Texas
and New Hampshire courts leaves the constitutional status of the quid
pro quo in doubt. Hence, state courts will not likely strike down medical
malpractice caps through quid pro quo due process analysis.3"
B. Equal Protection
Equal protection challenges to medical malpractice caps generate the
greatest debate. All but two courts that have struck down medical mal-
practice damage caps have relied primarily on equal protection analy-
sis.32 Although state courts employ the Supreme Court's framework for
equal protection analysis, the courts that invalidate caps invariably en-
gage in greater juridical scrutiny of economic or social welfare legislation
than does the Supreme Court.
33
1. The Supreme Court's Framework
When faced with an equal protection challenge to economic or social
welfare legislation, the Supreme Court demands that legislation treat
similarly those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of a
law. 34 Generally, the Court applies a "rational basis" test. Using this
highly deferential mode of analysis, the Court focuses solely on the
28. 120 N.H. 925, 943 (1980) (quoting Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass'n 63 Ill.2d 313,
347 N.E.2d 736).
29. 120 N.H. at 943-44. The court intermingled its discussion of equal protection and quid pro
quo in a manner that makes it difficult to determine what role quid pro quo played in its decision.
30. See DAMAGES, supra note 2 at 258 (indicating that the court did in fact apply quid pro quo
analysis).
31. One commentator suggests providing a quid pro quo when designing a cap on damages.
See Comment, Medical Malpractice: Constitutional Implications of a Cap on Damages, 6 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 61, 86-87 (1986).
32. Illinois struck down a medical malpractice cap on state constitutional grounds. See infra
notes 99-103 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit struck down Virginia's medical malprac-
tice cap as violative of the right to a jury trial. See infra, notes 108-121 and accompanying text.
33. "When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the
states wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually
be rectified by the democratic process," City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
(1985).
34. Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 346 (1949).
19871
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means a legislature uses to achieve a presumed legitimate goal.3 5 Thus, if
a legislature could rationally expect that the classifications a law creates
will accomplish its goals, the legislation is constitutional.
If legislation classifies individuals through a "suspect" criterion 36 or
affects a fundamental interest,37 the Supreme Court subjects it to "strict
scrutiny". 38 To survive strict scrutiny a statutory classification must be
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.39 At this level of scru-
tiny, the Court examines not only the validity of a legislature's goals but
also the means employed to achieve those goals.'
Between the extremes of the "rational basis" and "strict scrutiny" test
the Supreme Court has occasionally utilized an "intermediate" level of
review. Generally stated, intermediate scrutiny requires that a statutory
classification be substantially related to an important government inter-
est.41 The test originally emerged in instances of sex based classifica-
tions,42 and the Court has applied it in very narrow circumstances.43 In
effect, the means scrutiny of the rational relationship test is elevated to
"substantially related", without subjecting the government's purpose to
the demanding requirements of "strict scrutiny."
2. Characteristics of Medical Malpractice Statutes
Equal protection analysis ensures that a law does not unconstitution-
ally discriminate between classifications of individuals. Most often, par-
ties challenge medical malpractice caps by asserting that the caps favor a
35. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
36. Ifa statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin, the Court invokes the strict scru-
tiny test. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
37. The interests that the Court has found "fundamental" are: voting, see Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 349 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969); and mar-
riage, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
38. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
39. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Pro-
hibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L. J. 1071, 1074 (1974). Professor Gunther
notes that the "strict scrutiny" standard is almost impossible to meet, characterizing it as "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact," Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
40. Commentators generally refer to this dichotomy as the "two-tier" approach. Gunther,
supra, note 39 at 8.
41. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
42. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
43. The Court applied the test to gender, alienage, and illegitimacy cases. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-31, at 1090 (1978).
[Vol. 65:565
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss3/3
1987] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE CAPS
particular class in at least one of the following ways: (1) medical mal-
practice victims with moderate damages enjoy full recovery, while medi-
cal malpractice victims with damages above the cap do not; (2) plaintiffs
in medical malpractice actions are entitled only to limited recovery,
while plaintiffs in all other tort actions may receive full compensation for
damages; or (3) defendants in medical malpractice actions enjoy limited
liability, while defendants in all other tort actions do not receive such
protection. Generally, courts have concentrated on the classification be-
tween low-damage victims and high-damage victims.' This disparity in
treatment causes courts the most concern.45
The caps on damages that create these classifications take several dif-
ferent forms. The most extreme cap is an absolute limitation on the
amount of damages a successful plaintiff can recover.46 A variation on
this scheme sets the maximum amount for which a health care provider
may be held liable, and then supplements the jury verdict through a state
patient compensation fund.4 7 Some states also place a statutory limit on
the amount payable to injured plaintiffs from the fund.48 Under these
circumstances, the effect of a damage limitation is no different than an
absolute cap. Other legislatures, however, place no such limitation on
44. Courts may recognize inequities between other classifications, but the caps' constitutionality
usually turn on the "high cost victim"-"low cost victim" dichotomy. See Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 162, 695 P.2d 665, 683 (1985) (emphasizing no discrimination within
victim class); Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So.2d 783, 788 (Fla. 1985)
(emphasizing no discrimination within victim class); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 941, 424 A.2d
825, 837 (1980) (emphasizing distinction between patient classes); Arneson v. Olsen, 270 N.W.2d
125, 135 (N.D. 1978) (emphasizing distinction between patient classes); Baptist Hospital of South-
east Texas, Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (emphasizing distinction be-
tween patient classes), writ of error revoked, 717 S.W.2d 3 10 (Tex. 1986); State ex rel. Strykowski v.
Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 513, 261 N.W.2d 434, 444 (1978) (emphasizing no distinction within patient
class). But see Johnson, v. Saint Vincent Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 400, 404 N.E.2d, 585, 601
(1980) (upholding classification between patient classes and tort-feasors); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199
Neb. 97, 114-115, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669 (1977) (upholding classification between patient classes and
tort-feasors).
45. See supra note 42.
46. See IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (1975) (repealed 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 101
(1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (1985). Texas' statute placed an absolute cap on damages, TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(i), § 11.01 (Vernon 1987), but also included a provision for a non-
economic cap should the absolute cap be struck down. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(i),
§ 11.03 (Vernon Supp. 1987). Also, the Texas provision did not cap past and future medical
expenses.
47. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.54 (West Supp. 1986).
48. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns Supp. 1985). Wisconsin's patient compensation
fund includes a cap in the event that the fund becomes depleted. Wis. STAT. § 655.27(6) (1977).
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compensation fund reimbursements.49 Thus, successful plaintiffs only
suffer the inconvenience of payment under the compensation fund's
terms rather than the hardship of incomplete compensation. Finally,
some medical malpractice statutes limit only the amount of non-eco-
nomic damages recoverable by a successful plaintiff.5 0 This type of cap
affects only the plaintiff's right to compensation for pain, suffering, and
"intangible" losses.5" Hence, the hardship a medical malpractice victim
suffers because of damage caps varies significantly according to the type
of cap implemented.
3. State Court Analysis Under Equal Protection
No court has employed strict scrutiny to invalidate a cap on medical
malpractice damages.52 The affected classes do not display the tradi-
tional suspect criterion that triggers the use of strict scrutiny. In addi-
tion, courts rely on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Munn v.
Illinois53 that individuals have no property or vested interest in any rule
of common law. Without such an interest, individuals cannot claim full
recovery as a fundamental right. Caps on damages, therefore, do not
affect a fundamental right. As a result, the lack of a suspect class or
fundamental interest makes strict scrutiny inapplicable.
State courts have, however, applied both the "rational basis" test and
intermediate scrutiny to medical malpractice caps. The test a court
chooses often determines the statute's fate.54 Applying the rational basis
test generally results in a finding of constitutionality, while applying in-
termediate scrutiny often results in its constitutional demise.
a. rational basis
Every state court that has applied the rational basis test to medical
malpractice caps has found them constitutional. In Johnson v. Saint Vin-
cent's Hospital55 the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a patient compensa-
49. See supra note 47.
50. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 1982).
51. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 157 n.13, 695 P.2d 665, 679 n.13
(1985).
52. But see infra text accompanying notes 74-78.
53. 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877). Courts also invoke the Munn doctrine in due process analysis of
medical malpractice caps.
54. DAMAGES, supra note 2 at 253. This statement, however merits qualification. See infra
note 131.
55. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
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tion scheme that limited damages to $500,000.56 The court found that
the goal of preventing a reduction in health care services is rationally
served by limiting damages, because victims' actual recoveries might be
substantially less if health care providers are uninsured.57
Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court held in Prendergast v. Nelson 
58
that malpractice caps are rationally related to the goals of ensuring the
availability of health care and reasonably priced malpractice insurance.59
The court emphasized that under common law a victim does not enjoy
the assured $500,000 recovery fund that the state's malpractice act pro-
vides." The courts' rationales in Johnson and Prendergast assume that
medical malpractice costs drive health care providers into insolvency and
leave successful plaintiffs with unenforceable judgments. Hence, these
courts believed that preventing the reduction of health care services also
serves the interests of potential medical malpractice victims.
61
The Wisconsin, Florida, and California supreme courts also have ap-
plied the rational basis test to medical malpractice caps. The caps in
these statutes, however, do not absolutely limit all damages recoverable.
In State ex rel Strykowski v. Wilkie 62 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ap-
plied the rational basis test to a patient compensation fund that paid
awards in excess of $200,000.63 Because this statute only limited dam-
56. 273 Ind. at 401, 404 N.E.2d at 602. Indiana's statutory scheme limits health care provider
liability to $100,000 per occurrence, IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(b) and the total recovery for death or
injury to a patient to $500,000. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2.
57. 273 Ind. at 398, 404 N.E.2d at 600. The court noted that it could only deal with probabili-
ties in evaluating the rationality of limiting medical malpractice recoveries. It noted that if insurance
were unavailable, health care providers would have to pay, and the likelihood that they could pay
more than $500,000 was doubtful. Furthermore, even if insurance is available, sky-rocketing rates
may cause a health care provider to forgo the risk of a lawsuit and not obtain insurance. They
suggested that even an insured health care provider may carry limited coverage, and there is always
the chance that the insurer could go bankrupt. Hence, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that
even without the statute, a malpractice victim encounters tremendous uncertainty as to whether he
or she will be compensated fully. Id.
58. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
59. 199 Neb. at 112, 256 N.W.2d at 667.
60. 199 Neb. at 115, 256 N.W.2d at 669. Nebraska's damage cap is substantially the same as
Indiana's (see supra note 48). NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2825.
61. This must be the assumption if the courts' reasoning is to be persuasive. Otherwise, the
courts' rationale only explains the rationality of the caps in relation to a goal of protecting medical
malpractice victims rather than the stated goals. See supra text accompanying note 59.
62. 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
63. 81 Wis.2d at 508, 261 N.W.2d at 442.
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ages in the event that the fund fell below a certain level,' the compensa-
tion fund easily satisfied the rational basis test.65 The Florida Supreme
Court applied a similar rationale to its state compensation fund in Flor-
ida Patient Comp. v. Von Stetina 6 As the statutory scheme merely
transferred liability for judgments over $100,000 from individual health
care providers to a patient compensation fund, it satisfied the rational
relationship test.67
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, the California Supreme Court
held that a cap on noneconomic medical malpractice damages was ra-
tionally related to the goals of reducing insurance costs and eliminating
nonmeritorious claims.68 Since noneconomic damages often offer an in-
centive to pursue frivolous actions, the court reasoned, limiting
noneconomic damages would prevent nonmeritorious claims from de-
pleting the resources available for the most needy victims. 69 By sacrific-
ing noneconomic damages, insurance costs are reduced, health care
providers can obtain adequate coverage, and victims of medical malprac-
tice face less difficulty in collecting damages.70
The United States Supreme Court enforced the California Supreme
Court's decision in Fein by dismissing the case for want of a substantial
federal question.7" This strengthens the claim that noneconomic damage
caps "sufficiently the same" as California's are valid under the federal
constitution.72 The Supreme Court's ruling does not, of course, necessar-
ily govern the constitutionality of such a cap under state law. 3
64. This provision would have taken effect if the fund fell below a $2,500,000 level in any one
year, or below a $6,000,000 level for any 2 consecutive years. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.27(6).
65. 81 Wis.2d at 511, 261 N.W.2d at 444. The court refrained from addressing whether a
$500,000 cap on awards would be constitutional if.the fund were depleted, since the plaintiff had no
standing to raise the issue. Id.
66. 474 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1985).
67. 474 S.2d at 788-89. The court noted that it was not passing on the question of the plaintiff's
rights should the fund fall into insolvency, or place a limit on recovery. 474 So.2d at 789.
68. 38 Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665 (1985).
69. 38 Cal.3d at 159-163, 695 P.2d at 680-83.
70. 38 Cal.3d at 163, 695 P.2d at 683.
71. 106 S.Ct. 214 (1985).
72. The Supreme Court considers such a dismissal to be an adjudication on the merits,
although its precedential effect only applies to subsequent issues that are "sufficiently the same."
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See also Comment, California's Statutory Limit on Recovery
of Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions Does Not Violate Equal Protection, 64
WASH. U.L.Q. 645 (1986).
73. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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b. intermediate scrutiny
State courts that have invalidated medical malpractice caps on equal
protection grounds have generally applied some heightened standard of
review. It is not always apparent, however, exactly what level of scrutiny
a court is applying. It is simply not clear, for example, what test the
Texas Supreme Court applied in Baptist Hospital of Southeast Texas v.
Baber.74 Although the court recognized that equal protection analysis
usually involves strict scrutiny or the rational basis test,75 the court
struck down the state's $300,000 cap without clarifying which test it was
applying. The court concluded the limit 76 did nothing to compensate
seriously injured victims or eliminate frivolous claims.77 While appar-
ently applying what appears to be a rational basis test, however, the court
adopted the North Dakota Supreme Court's intermediate scrutiny
rationale.78
In Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center,79 the Ohio Supreme Court
applied some brand of heightened scrutiny to a cap on medical malprac-
tice damages-its analysis bordering on strict scrutiny. In Simon the
court relied on its earlier decision in Graley v. Satayatham80 to strike
down an absolute cap on damages. The court objected to the statute's
special protection of the medical profession and reduction of accountabil-
ity for health care providers."1 It concluded that "no compelling govern-
mental interest" existed that could legitimize withholding full
compensation from an injured party. 2 The search for a "compelling
governmental interest," however, is traditionally limited to strict scrutiny
analysis.83 Thus, like the Texas Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme
74. 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984), writ of error revoked, 717 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1986).
75. 672 S.W.2d at 298.
76. The cap limited all but medical and custodial damages. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4901, § 11.02 (Vernon 1984).
77. 672 S.W.2d at 298.
78. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). "[T]he limitation of recovery does not
provide adequate compensation to patients with meritorious claims; on the contrary, it does just the
opposite for the most seriously injured claimants. It does nothing toward the elimination of non-
meritorious claims." Id. at 135-36.
79. 3 Ohio Op.3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. Com. P1. 1976).
80. 74 Ohio Op.2d 316 (Ct. Comm. Pl. 1976).
81. 3 Ohio Op.3d at 172, 355 N.E.2d at 911 (quoting Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op.2d at
320).
82. 3 Ohio Op.3d at 172, 355 N.E.2d at 911.
83. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1088-90
(1969).
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Court emphasized the seeming inequity of limiting full recovery rather
than applying a formal framework of equal protection analysis.
The North Dakota and New Hampshire supreme courts, however,
have clearly articulated an intermediate level of scrutiny for analyzing
medical malpractice caps. In Arneson v. Olson 4 the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that the state's $300,000 limitation on overall
medical malpractice damages failed to provide compensation for merito-
rious claims and was ineffective in limiting nonmeritorious claims."5 The
court also implied that no medical malpractice crisis existed in North
Dakota, 6 and noted how low the cap was in comparison to other
states.8 7 Given these considerations, the statute could not "bear a rea-
sonable relationship to a legitimate government interest."88
In Carson v. Maurer 9 the New Hampshire Supreme Court looked to
whether the state's medical malpractice cap bore a "fair and substantial
relation" to legitimate legislative objectives. The court applied North
Dakota's rationale for striking down the absolute cap in Olson90 to inval-
idate a cap on noneconomic damages. Apparently, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court considered noneconomic damages an integral part of the
"adequate compensation' "91 the Olson court sought to ensure. 92
One state court that had used intermediate scrutiny to analyze a cap
on medical malpractice damages appears to have reconsidered the pro-
priety of employing heightened constitutional analysis. In Jones v. State
Board of Medicine93 the Idaho Supreme Court utilized a "means focus" 94
test to examine a $300,000 cap on medical malpractice damages.95 The
court seriously questioned whether a medical malpractice crisis existed in
84. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
85. See supra note 78.
86. 270 N.W.2d at 136.
87. Id. at 135.
88. Id. (setting forth the appropriate standard for equal protection review).
89. -120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
90. See supra note 78.
91. 270 N.W.2d at 135.
92. 120 N.H. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837. The court emphasized that non-economic damages are
the only vehicle through which courts may compensate medical malpractice victims, "for the pain,
suffering, physical impairment or disfigurement that the victim must endure until death." Id.
93. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
94. Id. The court borrowed Professor Gunther's "means focus" test of whether the legislative
means substantially furthers some specifically identifiable legislative end. Gunther, In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on the Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1972).
95. IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (1975) (repealed 1981).
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Idaho, but refrained from passing on the cap's constitutionality. Rather,
the court remanded with instructions to scrutinize the cap in light of a
heightened standard of review.96 A later ruling by the Idaho Court of
Appeals, however, departed from the Jones ruling. In Packard v. Joint
School District No. 17197 the Idaho Court of Appeals announced that the
rational basis test was the appropriate level of scrutiny for evaluating a
$100,000 damage cap under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.98 Hence, the
exact status of intermediate scrutiny in Idaho remains unclear.
Only one state court has invalidated medical malpractice caps on
grounds other than equal protection.99 In Wright v. Central Du Page
Hospital Association,1" the Illinois Supreme Court found a $500,000 cap
on damages in medical malpractice actions violative of a state constitu-
tional provision against "special legislation." 101 Although a lower court
had declared that the cap violated equal protection,102 the Illinois
Supreme Court based its decision almost exclusively on state constitu-
tional grounds." 3
Although courts do not adhere to a uniform level of equal protection
scrutiny in striking down malpractice caps, their objections to damage
limitations are quite consistent. Several courts are concerned that medi-
cal malpractice can subsidize health care providers at the expense of se-
verely injured malpractice victims."°  The harshness of allowing
empirically ascertainable injury to pass unredressed offends the sensibili-
ties of many courts.105 Furthermore, state courts often voice skepticism
96. 97 Idaho at 870, 555 P.2d at 410. On remand, the district court found the limitation uncon-
stitutional. Jones v. State Board of Medicine, Nos. 55527 and 55586 (4th Dist. Idaho, Nov. 3, 1980).
97. 104 Idaho 604, 661 P.2d 770 (Idaho App. 1983).
98. 104 Idaho at 607, 661 P.2d at 773. The court felt that Jones "unduly narrowed the 'rational
basis' standard of equal protection in Idaho." Id. Significantly, the court held that the $100,000 cap
on recovery for personal injury or wrongful death actions was constitutional. 104 Idaho at 609, 661
P.2d at 775.
99. A federal district court, however, recently invalidated a medical malpractice damage cap on
jury trial grounds. See infra notes 107-126 and accompanying text.
100. 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
101. ILL. CONs-I. art. IV, § 13.
102. 63 Ill.2d at 330, 347 N.E.2d at 744.
103. 63 Ill.2d at 321. The court discussed whether the malpractice cap provided a quidpro quo,
but did not rely on this analysis in its holding.
104. See Carson v. Mauer, 120 N.H. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837; Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d at
136; Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op.3d at 172, 355 N.E.2d at 911 (quoting Graley
v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op.2d at 320).
105. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d at 135; Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio
Op.3d at 172, 355 N.E.2d at 911 (quoting Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op.2d at 320); Baber, 672
S.W.2d at 298.
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as to whether a medical malpractice crisis even exists in their state.10 6 As
a result, damage limitations that minimize these concerns and avoid the
disparities noted under equal protection analysis display a much greater
potential for surviving judicial scrutiny.
II. SCRUTINIZING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE CAPS UNDER
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
A novel approach to scrutinizing medical malpractice caps involves
the examination of their effect on a plaintiff's right to a jury trial. In
Boyd v. Bulala I7 the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Virginia announced that an absolute cap on medical malpratice
damages interfered with a plaintiff's federal and state right to a jury trial
and was, therefore, constitutionally invalid. 108 Not only is Boyd the first
case to invalidate a statute on this basis,"0 9 but it is also the only federal
case speaking to the issue of caps on medical malpractice damages. 110
The District Court in Boyd rejected due process and equal protection
challanges to Virginia's $750,000 cap on medical malpractice dam-
ages."11 The court, however, did not so easily dismisss the plaintiff's jury
trial challenge to Virginia's malpractice cap. The court noted that the
106. See Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho at 871-76; Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d at
136. But see Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I1l.2d at 334, 347 N.E.2d at 746 (Under-
wood, J., dissenting) ("Theory, fact and fiction are well-nigh inextricably intermingled. Despite this,
it is clear that serious problems do exist."); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op.3d at
172, 355 N.E.2d at 911 ("There is no doubt that the plethora of medical malpractice suits represents
a crisis situation.")
107. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), reh'g denied, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987) (motion
for reconsideration brought by Commonwealth of Virginia).
108. Id. at 789.
109. In Johnson v. Saint Vincent's Hospital the Indiana Supreme Court disregarded a plaintiff's
jury trial challenge. The court reasoned that an absolute cap on patient compensation fund reim-
bursement does not interfere with the jury's determination of damages. Rather, the cap simply
apportions the verdict as to how much the compensation fund will pay. 273 Ind. 374, 400-01, 404
N.E.2d 585, 601-02. The court also noted that the cap does not purport to predetermine factually
what damages are appropriate; the policy of the act limits awards to $500,000. Id.
110. Of course, the Supreme Court's dismissal of Fein for want of a substantial federal question,
106 S.Ct. 214 (1985) does carry some precedential weight, but Boyd is the first case to develop the
issue in detail.
111. 647 F. Supp. at 787-88. The District Court rejected the notion that quid pro quo provides a
basis for stricter due process scrutiny. 647 F. Supp. at 786. The court also felt that the Supreme
Court's decision in Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978),
that damage caps do not violate equal protection controlled. 647 F. Supp. at 786.
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right to a jury trial prevails in federal diversity cases.1 12 Because the
seventh amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits any interference
with a jury's ultimate determination of factual questions, 113 the Court
has held that it is solely the jury's province to decide questions of liability
and the extent of injury by assessing damages.114
The district court assumed that a court can only enforce a damage
limitation by instructing the jury of the limitation,115 or by refusing to
enter a judgment that exceeds the statutory limit.'16 Either method, the
court concluded, infringes on the fact finding role that the jury serves in
assessing damages.' 17 The damage cap therefore, infringes on the sev-
enth amendment right to a jury trial. 18 Because the Virginia constitu-
tion's right to a civil jury119 is substantially the same as the federal right,
the district court also invalidated Virginia's medical malpratice cap
under the state constitution. 120
The Boyd court objected to Virginia's medical malpractice damage cap
primarily because it resulted in a "judgment predetermined by the legis-
lature" that damages could not exceed $750,000.121 Unlike a court ap-
plying the doctrine of remittitur or the power to set aside a verdict and
order a new trial, a court enforcing an absolute cap on damages applies
no "proper legal standard." Rather, an absolute cap on damages creates
the presumption that damages do not exceed the statutory limit.I22
The district court qualified its holding, however, by noting that a legis-
lature may establish rules governing the type of damages recoverable and
112. 647 F. Supp. at 788 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525
(1958)).
113. 647 F. Supp. at 788 (citing Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 474 (1935)).
114. 647 F. Supp. at 788 (citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935)).
115. Such a measure would also involve ordering a reduction of the ad damnum of the com-
plaint. 647 F. Supp. at 788.
116, 647 F. Supp. at 788.
117. The court decided that instructing the jury of the cap prohibits the jury from considering
damages above the cap. Likewise, refusing to enter a jury's verdict effectively invalidates its findings.
647 F. Supp. at 788.
118. 647 F. Supp. at 789,
119. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
120. 647 F. Supp. at 789. The District Court complied with Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1978), when it considered whether the results would be the same under
both the federal and state constitutions. Because the court reached the same conclusion under the
state and federal constitutions, the Byrd test played no role in its decision. 647 F. Supp. at 789.
121. 647 F. Supp. at 789.
122. Id.
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the method for payment.123 Likewise, it is clearly within a legislature's
province to set forth procedural mechanisms that limit jury discretion. 124
The court also suggested that legislatures are free to replace common law
rights of action with compensation schemes.125 Hence, the Boyd court
appears to have limited its holding to absolute medical malpractice caps
similar to the Virginia scheme.
Despite the limited nature of the Boyd court's holding, its rationale
leads to anomalous results. Through strict adherence to the Boyd hold-
ing, a legislature may abolish the common law right of action for medical
malpractice, yet it cannot take the less drastic course of limiting dam-
ages. Similarly, a legislature could eliminate categories of damages,
t27
which would affect a plaintiff's recovery virtually the same as an absolute
damage cap. Merely by modifying its statutory mechanism, therefore, a
legislature could circumvent the jury trial problems cited in Boyd and
still severely curtail a plaintiff's recovery in medical malpractice
actions. 12
8
III. THE REMAINING "SAFE HARBORS" FOR LIMITING MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE DAMAGES
As the examination of state courts' equal protection analyses and the
Fourth Circuit's jury trial analysis indicates, the constitutional validity of
medical malpractice damage caps hinges on the nature of the cap in ques-
tion. 29 The courts striking down medical malpractice damage caps have
123. Id. The court noted Florida's statutory scheme of a state compensation fund with periodic
payments. 647 F. Supp. at 789, n.7.
124. "The legislature may prescribe rules of procedure and evidence, create legal presumptions,
allocate burdens of proof, and the like." 647 F. Supp. at 789.
125. Id. The court cited Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59
at 88, in support of this proposition. 647 F. Supp. at 789, n.6.
126. "[Tihe legislature may abolish a common law right of action and, if it desires, replace it
with a compensation scheme," 647 F. Supp. at 789 (emphasis added).
127. For instance: wrongful death damages, future earnings, pain and suffering, health care
costs, lost earnings.
128. The District Court also assumed that a limit on medical malpractice damages creates a
statutory presumption that damages could not exceed the statutory limit. See supra notes 121-122
and accompanying text. This characterization is not necessarily true. A statutory limit on damages
merely subordinates a plaintiff's right to enforce a jury's finding of damages to the legislature's
policy that it will not endorse awarding damages to medical malpractice victims over a set amount.
The jury's finding of fact, therefore, remains undisturbed. A cap on damages only affects the en-
forceability of a jury verdict. See Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 273 Ind. at 400-01, 404 N.E.2d
at 601-02.
129. See supra notes 104-06 and 123-24 and accompaftying text.
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not precluded legislatures from adopting alternative means of limiting
damages in medical malpractice actions. Many state courts that have
struck down medical malpractice caps as unconstitutional may hold
otherwise, if presented a less drastic limitation. Certainly the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Boyd left vast areas open to statutory damage limita-
tions. 130 Of course, it is impossible to unequivocally predict a state
court's reaction to medical malpractice caps.131  Nevertheless, close ex-
amination of judicial objections to various damage caps illuminates "safe
harbors" that remain for legislatures. This section will consider the con-
tinuing viability of absolute caps, non-economic caps, patient compensa-
tion funds, and Illinois' particularized verdict requirement in light of
judicial objections to malpractice caps.132
A. Absolute Caps
Statutes that place an absolute limit on damages recoverable in medi-
cal malpractice actions are most vulnerable to judicial invalidation. 133 Of
the five damage caps upheld, only Indiana's 134 and Nebraska's1 35 actu-
ally placed a ceiling on the total amount of economic and non-economic
damages. Conversely, of the seven medical malpractice caps struck
down, only two were not absolute limits on over-all damages.
136
130. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
131. One commentator suggests that the level of equal protection analysis a court employs deter-
mines what decision the court will reach on a cap's constitutionality. In turn, another commentator
suggests that looking to the level of scrutiny a court has applied to its state's automobile guest statute
gives a reliable indication of what equal protection test a court will apply to medical malpractice
caps. "Constitutionality of Recent Malpractice Legislation," 13 FORUM 312, 330 (1977). Such an
analysis, however, seems to "place the cart before the horse." Most state courts rely on the facial
inequity of statutory classifications to determine which level of equal protection scrutiny they will
employ. Eg., Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 867. Hence, the nature of the classifi-
cation in question determines what test a court applies and what outcome it reaches.
132. See infra notes 171-183 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Illinois particularized
verdict requirement.
133. This classification includes direct limits on total damages recoverable and patient compen-
sation funds that pay only a limited amount. It does not include patient compensation funds that
may establish a cap if the fund falls below a given level, (see infra note 139) nor does it include
patient compensation funds that pay up to a set amount, at which point responsibility for paying the
excess reverts back to the health care provider (see infra note 138).
134. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2 (1985) (absolute limit on the patient compensation fund).
135. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (1985) (absolute limit on damages recoverable).
136. These two were: New Hampshire's $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages, N. H. REV.
STAT. ANN. 507-c:7 II (Supp. 1979); and Texas' $500,000 cap on all damages except past and future
medical, hospital, and custodial treatment, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon
1984).
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Significantly, in rejecting due process and equal protection challenges
to a cap on non-economic damages, the California Supreme Court indi-
cated that its cap was not nearly as harsh as an absolute cap.1 37 Like-
wise, the Florida Supreme Court qualified its validation of an absolute
limit on health care provider liability by noting that the legislature had
not modified the total dollar amount recoverable.1 38 Hence, even in state
courts that have upheld limitations on medical malpractice damages, an
absolute cap curries very little judicial favor. 139
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Duke Power v. Carolina Envi-
ronmental Study Group Inc.,"4 however, supports the validity of abso-
lute damage caps under the federal constitution. In Duke Power the
Supreme Court upheld an absolute damage cap limiting recovery in case
of a nuclear accident to $560 million. The Indiana Supreme Court sug-
gested that the dilemma of the health care industry is analogous to that
of the nuclear power industry, and that Duke Power implies constitution-
ality for malpractice caps.14
The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, distinguished the Duke
Power cap from a malpractice cap. In Duke Power, damages above the
limit were unlikely, and Congress had committed to paying damages
above the limit, thus justifying the damage limitation.' 42 Duke Power's
significance therefore is arguable at best. In addition, even if Duke Power
is applicable, it does not save absolute caps from invalidation under state
constitutions. 43 Given the hostile reaction to absolute caps by a major-
ity of state courts, such damage limitations would provide the more pre-
carious course for a legislature to follow.
B. Noneconomic Caps
Statutes that limit only noneconomic damage recovery in medical mal-
practice actions stand an excellent chance of passing judicial scrutiny.
137. Fein, 38 Cal.3d at 161.
138. 747 So.2d at 789. The Florida statute places a cap on health care provider liability, but no
limit is placed on its patient compensation fund.
139. In State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978) the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld a patient compensation fund wherein awards would be limited to $500,000 if
the fund fell below a certain level. The court reserved its judgment on the validity of the "condi-
tional cap" for such time when the cap became effective. Id. at 444.
140. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
141. 273 Ind. at 395-96; 404 N.E.2d at 599.
142. 270 N.W.2d at 135, n.6.
143. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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Only the California'" and New Hampshire 45 supreme courts have
passed on the constitutionality of caps on noneconomic damages in a
medical malpractice action. New Hampshire is the only state whose
supreme court has invalidated a medical malpractice noneconomic dam-
age cap. The New Hampshire court objected to the cap because it con-
sidered pain and suffering "a very material element of damages in tort
cases."1 46
The decisions of other state courts do not reflect the concerns that the
New Hampshire Supreme Court voiced. Many courts fret over the pros-
pect that victims with meritorious claims receive no compensation for
some injuries.147 Likewise, courts striking down statutes conclude that
medical malpractice caps prove ineffective in eliminating nonmeritorious
claims. 148
The conclusions of the California Supreme Court, however, demon-
strate that noneconomic caps minimize these concerns. 149 Reducing the
prospects for inflated noneconomic damages hedges against nonmeritori-
ous claims by eliminating "the unknown possibility of phenomenal
awards for pain and suffering that can make litigation worth the gam-
ble."' 0 Likewise, the California Court alluded to the highly tentative
relationship between noneconomic damages and compensating malprac-
tice victims for losses.' 5'
The arbitrary nature of awards for pain and suffering further mitigates
in favor of a legislature limiting such damages. New Hampshire's con-
cern that victims' noneconomic harm would go uncompensated is un-
founded. A cap on noneconomic damages does not eliminate
noneconomic damages, but rather limits the amount recoverable for
noneconomic harm. 152
144. 39 Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665 (1985). See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
145. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825.
146. 120 N.H. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837.
147. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d at 135; Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio
Op.3d at 172, 355 N.E.2d at 911; Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas, Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d at
298.
148. See supra note 147.
149. 38 Cal.3d at 159-63, 695 P.2d at 680-83.
150. 38 Cal.3d at 163, 695 P.2d at 683.
151. 38 Cal.3d at 159, n.16, 695 P.2d at 681.
152. For example, if a state places a $500,000 cap on pain and suffering, a jury can consider the
cap amount as a reference point for determining noneconomic harm. The most heinous instances of
pain and suffering would merit a verdict for $500,000. Less shocking examples of noneconomic
harm would result in reducing the verdict proportionately. (A negligently severed finger might only
1987]
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Federal courts should not object to a cap on noneconomic damages.
The Supreme Court essentially placed its imprimature of approval on
Fein when it dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion. 153 Likewise the Boyd court specifically noted that legislatures are
free to determine the types of damages a plaintiff may recover. 54 Thus, it
is .clear that legislatures should seriously consider imposing caps on
noneconomic damages as an alternative or supplement to other damage
limitations. 155
C. Patient Compensation Funds
Patient compensation funds provide another "safe harbor" for legisla-
tures that wish to limit the liability of health care providers. 156 No state
court has specifically invalidated a patient compensation fund as uncon-
stitutionally limiting damages.15 7 In fact, two courts have upheld funds
that could limit a medical malpractice victim's recovery. The Indiana
Supreme Court upheld a patient compensation fund that limited a plain-
tiff's recovery to $500,000.158 Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld a fund that placed a conditional cap on plaintiff recovery." 9 The
Florida Supreme Court upheld a patient compensation fund that did not
limit recovery, but the court refused to address whether the fund would
be constitutional in the event that it became insolvent.' 6  Given, how-
merit a $1,000 verdict for pain and suffering.) The legislature simply provides a "spectrum of pain
and suffering" to which a jury can refer in rendering its verdict.
153. 106 S.Ct. 214 (1985). See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
154. 647 F. Supp. at 789.
155. Of course, this alternative is foreclosed to states with special constitutional provisions that
govern damage caps. Certainly Illinois could not impose a noneconomic damage cap after its
supreme court's decision in Wright. Supra, notes 99-103 and accompanying text. Likewise, other
state constitutions have provisions that may bar setting noneconomic damage caps. See e.g., ARIZ.
CONST. art. 18, § 6; Ky. CONST. § 54; OKLA. CONsT. art. XXIII, § 7 (provisions barring imposition
of damage caps in personal injury actions).
156. For a thorough discussion of patient compensation funds and how they operate see Note,
Patients' Compensation Fund and the Bad Faith Cause of Action: Two Proposed Amendments to the
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, 17 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1603 (1986)
[hereinafter COMP. FUND.].
157. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, struck down a patient compensation fund in
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, since it was an integral part of medical malpractice legislation
that was unconstitutional as a whole. 270 N.W.2d at 137-38. Also, the Kentucky Supreme Court
struck down a patient compensation fund in McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977) as viola-
tive of a constitutional provision restricting the extension of state credit. Id. at 416.
158. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss3/3
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE CAPS
ever, the general opposition to absolute caps 16 ' and the reservations of
the Florida and Wisconsin supreme courts, 162 patient compensation
funds that absolutely limit plaintiffs' recoveries may risk invalidation.
Patient compensation funds need not, however, place an absolute cap
on recovery. For example, Florida's patient compensation fund places
no cap on plaintiff recovery. 163 Recently, however, Florida and other
states have encountered difficulty in maintaining a solvent compensation
fund.16' In response to this problem, one commentator has suggested
placing a statutory maximum on the amount recoverable from patient
compensation funds. 165  This proposal avoids the infirmity of absolute
caps, however, by shifting the burden for payment of damages above the
statutory limit back to the health care provider. 166 Such a scheme would
eliminate state courts' concern that victims of malpractice will go un-
compensated for damages beyond the statutory limit. 1
67
Patient compensation funds with no cap or modified caps minimize the
problem of insurance availability for health care providers without de-
priving victims with meritorious claims of full compensation. 168  The
Boyd court voiced no objection to compensation funds, and approved
compensation schemes that replace common law rights of action. 69 Pa-
tient compensation funds, therefore, exhibit an excellent potential for
surviving judicial scrutiny.'70 Given the solvency difficulties that some
state compensation funds have recently encountered, however, legisla-
161. See supra text accompanying notes 129-39.
162. See supra notes 134 and 135.
163. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768, 54 (West 1986).
164. Florida's fund became insolvent in 1983. United States General Accounting Office, Medical
Malpractice: Six State Case Studies Show Claims and Insurance Cost Still Rise Despite Reforms,
GAO/HRD - 87-21, page 28 (December 1986). Likewise, even though Indiana's patient compensa-
tion fund has a $500,000 cap, state officials still express concern about the fund's solvency. Id. at 31.
Twelve states still utilize patient compensation funds. COMP. FUND, supra note 153 at 1615.
165. TEX. MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT TO THE
65TH LEGISLATURE: MINORITY REPORT OF PAGE KEETON, at 50 (1976), cited in COMP. FUND,
supra note 153 at 1609, n.44.
166. For example, under this type of compensation fund, health care provider liability is limited
to $100,000. The compensation fund pays up to $500,000 of damages above $100,000. If, however,
a portion of the jury verdict remains unsatisfied, it is the health care provider's responsibility to pay
damages in excess of the cap.
167. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
170. As is the case with noneconomic caps, however (see supra note 155), state constitutional
provisions may stand in the way of legislatures' intent on enacting patient compensation funds. See
COMP. FUND, supra note 157 at 1620-21.
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tures should consider supplementing such funds with caps on
noneconomic damages.
D. The Illinois System
Illinois has instituted a system of particularizing jury verdicts as an
alternative to monetary limitations on medical malpractice awards. In
response to the decision in Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital171 the
Illinois legislature amended its medical malpractice statute.' 72 These
amendments leave less room for inflated jury verdicts, and make it easier
for courts to review the propriety of damage awards.
Under the Illinois system, a jury must itemize the distribution of its
verdict between economic and noneconomic loss.17 In addition, the jury
must specify what damages it awards for past injury, and what damages
it awards for future injury. 174 The jury must further specify what portion
of its award covers medical and health care costs 175 and what portion
includes lost wages or loss of earning capacity. 176 Punitive damages are
not recoverable under any action for medical malpractice. 77 After the
jury enters its verdict, the court is free to consider the propriety of each
itemized finding and apply appropriate set-offs and remittiturs178
The Illinois system provides an attractive alternative for legislatures
that fear negative judicial reaction to medical malpractice damage caps.
Certainly no burden other than the ordinary burden of proof inures to
medical malpractice victims. Parties to medical malpractice actions,
therefore, are treated no differently than parties in other tort actions. 79
Likewise, this approach establishes no classification between malpractice
victims with different damage levels.' 80 Thus, courts that have invali-
dated damage caps on the basis of equal protection should approve the
171. 63 I1l.2d 305, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
172. 1985 Ill. Laws 211.
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1109 (1985).
174. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100, para. 2-1706 (1985).
175. Id.
176. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1109 (1985).
177. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1115 (1985).
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1708(1) (1985). Also, § 2-1205 outlines specific considera-
tions for reducing judgments. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1205 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
Given the specificity this act requires of juries, it should be much easier for a court to determine
exactly what portion of a jury verdict is questionable, and modify it accordingly.
179. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. The one exception is that punitive damages
are not available under the Illinois system, while these awards may be available in some tort actions.
180. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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Illinois system.1 81 Finally, a system requiring greater specificity in jury
verdicts does not violate the jury trial concerns highlighted in Boyd v.
Bulala. The Illinois approach is precisely the type of procedure that the
Boyd court suggested is within a legislator's province to invoke. '82
The Illinois system guards against arbitrary damage awards, and facili-
tates the court's review of verdicts that appear excessive. It does not,
however, offer the predictability for health care provider liability that
more direct limitations provide. Also, the system's effectiveness depends
largely on how zealously courts insist on jury compliance and to what
extent they are willing to question excessive verdicts. Hence, a system
for particularizing jury verdicts would serve as an excellent supplement
to a cap on noneconomic damages or a patient compensation fund. Of
course, for a state whose judiciary has invalidated noneconomic damage
caps or patient compensation funds,' 83 the Illinois system provides a very
attractive alternative.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many avenues remain by which legislatures may limit liability in medi-
cal malpractice actions. Patient compensation funds, caps on
noneconomic damages, and requirements for particularized jury verdicts
all offer constitutionally viable alternatives to absolute damage caps. In
light of state courts' concerns for fairness, the perceived malpractice in-
surance crisis, and the lack of firm guidance from the Supreme Court on
the constitutionality of absolute damage caps, 18 4 the most prudent course
for legislatures may lie in these "safe harbors." '85
Jason A. Parson
181. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 125 and note 157.
184, Until the Supreme Court decides whether absolute limitations on medical malpractice caps
are constitutional, the book remains open on their validity. The Supreme Court may never decide
this issue, especially in view of Fein, where the Court specifically dismissed for lack of a substantial
federal question. But see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 474 U.S. at 898 (White, J., dissenting)
(finding such controversy surrounding the import of Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), that he felt the case did present a substantial federal question).
185. Among these "safe harbors" the most attractive alternative might be to limit noneconomic
damages as well as require particularized jury verdicts, given the solvency problems that have arisen
with patient compensation funds. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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